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Abstract 
Real estate development is an intensely social process dependent on rich networks of relations 
between public- and private-sector actors. Previous work has explored how far such relations 
are formalised in large cities through shared coalitions of interest intended to promote urban 
growth. Relatively little attention has been given to networks in smaller cities, which is the 
concern of this paper. 
Drawing on detailed research in a small Scottish city, the paper explores how its local network 
was characterised by strong reliance on network construction and reproduction through trust 
and reputation. Significantly, within such local networks, competition and collaboration can 
exist side by side, without subsuming normal tensions into consistent agendas or formally-
defined ‘partnerships’. Controlling land for urban expansion provides a particular focus for 
these tensions since it can allow certain interests to gain network dominance. These findings 
raise important concerns around whether small cities should rely on informal networks to 
promote growth instead of constructing formal coalitions that may attract more externally-
based actors. Such choices have profound implications for the capacity and transparency of 
development networks, and thus for the accountability of the urban development process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper explores how real estate development is organised in small cities and its 
implications for urban growth and democratic accountability. It is widely believed that such 
development is not driven solely by market exchange, still less by policy command, but is a 
highly socialised form of production, in which the complex web of relations between many 
different actors is crucial to explaining outcomes. The word ‘network’ is often deployed to 
describe this form of production, with the implication that in different cities and at different 
times, particular forms of local network will emerge that have profound impacts on the way 
those cities change over time. 
 
It is perhaps surprising that, despite strong theoretical foundations, relatively few attempts have 
been made to understand how local development networks actually operate. Research has 
concentrated on the broader contribution of networks to growth coalitions and urban regimes, 
especially in larger cities, but there has been little published on the extent to which the structure 
and organisation of such networks in different cities open up or close down opportunities for 
development itself. This paper is intended to redress this imbalance through a detailed 
investigation of the particular network that appears to have characterised one small city in 
Scotland in recent years. Its key purpose is to uncover some of the distinctive characteristics 
of small-city networks and the extent to which they may be prone to informality, exclusivity, 
and dominance by a narrow set of local interests. By exploring how network management 
(Klijn et al., 2010) creates a specific set of development outcomes, this paper offers new 
insights on how network structures and relationships at a small city level can help explain 
whether or not individual projects are delivered, the extent to which public and private sectors 
share common agendas, and the implications of these for accountability and good governance. 
 
Here, we agree with Bell and Jayne’s (2009: 683) assertion that “small cities have been ignored 
by urban theorists who, in seeking to conceptualize broad urban agendas and depict 
generalizable models… have tended to obscure as much as they illuminate.” While some 
scholars have deployed quantitative analyses to compare the economic performance or 
potential of small cities against medium-sized or larger ones (see for example Erickcek and 
McKinney, 2006; Rubin, 1986), there has been remarkably little previous investigative work 
into network dynamics at a small city level. We seek to fill that gap and challenge the 
presumption that what may be known about development networks in major cities can be 
readily transferred to smaller places. 
 
Two specific dimensions of scale, which generated our interest in small cities, are especially 
worthy of close investigation. First, actors with significant resources may be better placed to 
dominate development networks in smaller cities than in much larger ones. So, in this paper, 
we investigate the relationship between city size, network structure and any consequent 
potential for the most powerful local interests to capture development networks in small cities 
and deploy them to their own advantage. 
 
Secondly, such networks may be less formal, and indeed less obvious, in smaller than in larger 
cities, simply because the key actors are already well-known to each other, having built 
longstanding relations of trust through established business and social connections. Although 
informal networks in small cities can be hard to investigate, it is important to do so since the 
evidence we report in this paper raises worrying concerns around exclusivity, fragility and 
democratic accountability that derive directly from their very informality. We therefore concur 
with Ball and Jayne (2009) who, in arguing that smallness cannot be understood merely by 
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reference to population size, density or growth, call for research that “pursue(s) an 
understanding of the ways in which smallness is bound up with particular ways of acting, self-
images, structures of feeling, senses of place, aspirations and so on” (Ball and Jayne, 2009: 
690). Our work thus focuses on the issue of urban scale, and the domains in which real estate 
development, and the networks which support it, might be considered distinctive in small cities.  
 
In developing specific research questions, we chose to reflect the approach of Eva Sørensen 
and Jacob Torfing (2005; 2009), who have created a substantial body of research over several 
years exploring how urban governance networks operate in practice, the extent to which such 
networks variously contribute to or detract from the democratic nature of policy development, 
and how networks need to be managed to secure the best possible outcomes from them.  
 
Specifically, we draw on three key themes emerging from the literature to construct the 
analytical framework through which to interrogate the research data. The first theme around 
network governance focused our interest on exploring evidence of tension in Inverness between 
public- and private-sector interests and considering its implications for the city. The second 
theme around network dynamics made us interested in dispositions of power within the local 
informal network and on the broader consequences of this for urban growth. The third theme 
of network inclusion and exclusion made us want to identify those actors at the core of the local 
informal network and those at the edge, and to investigate exactly how such selectivity was 
achieved and what its implications were for the future of the city. We expressed this analytical 
framework as three central research questions through which we connected our interrogation 
of the research data to the key themes from the literature: 
 
1. To what extent does the way in which local development networks in small cities operate 
reflect an unresolved tension between the business interests of their most powerful 
members and what might be considered the shared interests of the city as a whole? 
 
2. How vulnerable are local development networks in small cities to capture by their most 
powerful members and how far does this constrain a city’s ability to grow? 
 
3. How far does the reliance of small city local development networks on informal 
connectivity, trust and personal reputation exclude certain actors who might have 
significant contribution to make to city development? 
 
The paper now proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature from which the three 
research questions are drawn. The research method is explained in Section 3, while Section 4 
outlines the main development challenges faced by the chosen city – Inverness – over the past 
25 years. Drawing on planning records that detail exactly who was at the forefront of building 
Inverness between 1997 and 2013, and on our own rich interview material, Section 5, 6 and 7 
then provide a detailed empirical investigation of the three research questions. The closeness 
of key actors revealed by this account raises broader concerns over transparency and 
accountability in a small city’s network, which are discussed in the final section. 
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2. THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT NETWORKS 
 
Development actors and modes of governance 
 
Real estate development is widely regarded as an intensely social process, in which relations 
between key actors are crucial to successful negotiation. Although developers are often 
portrayed as near-theatrical impresarios who co-ordinate and drive development forward 
(Fainstein, 1994), their effectiveness will depend on linkages with other key actors such 
landowners, funders, investors and knowledgeable professionals, and of course, the local state. 
In the latter context, day-to-day contact with planners, transport engineers and other local 
officials can be as important as high-level connectivity to senior politicians. The concept of 
local development networks embraces all these actors, as well as the local media, trade 
associations and so on. Crucially, the actual composition of particular networks will vary 
significantly over time and space and can be ascertained only by empirical investigation. 
 
The significance of local networks reflects the complexity of putting together individual 
development projects and long-term strategies for a city or region (Kostiainen, 2002). Such 
endeavours require a mode of governance that can promote effective co-ordination between 
many different actors. In this context, markets seek to co-ordinate social and economic life 
through the price mechanism, hierarchies try to do so through authority, while networks work 
primarily through trust and collaboration (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). This means that the 
delivery of real estate development now depends on “decision-making processes (that) take 
place within complex networks of actors”, with the capacity of local political leaders and 
institutions crucial to success (Klijn et al., 2010: 1063). 
 
Network collaboration and structures for real estate development 
 
Local development networks evolve from what Henneberry and Parris (2013: 231) describe as 
“episodic project collaboration.” Such networks often grow and mature experientially as 
successful collaboration on particular projects generates ‘swift trust’ promoting subsequent 
actor co-operation. Henneberry and Parris (2013) identify a two-layered ecology that explains 
network relationships behind projects. The inner ‘organisational’ layer consists of the core 
development team driving the project forward, operating within the firm(s) that employs that 
team and marshals resources to deliver a portfolio of projects. Both of these are surrounded by 
the project’s ‘epistemic community’ or variety of external professional specialists called upon 
to solve particular tasks. Even if the core team and firm(s) remain unchanged from one project 
to another, the epistemic community is usually reconfigured for each project. 
 
Beyond this inner organisation layer can be found an outer ‘social layer’ reflecting the looser 
‘personal networks’, both professional and private, of all involved in the inner organisational 
layer. As Lawton-Smith and Romeo (2012) note studying business and professional networks 
in Oxfordshire, there can be both ‘formal’ networks, which normally have officers, fees and 
regular meetings, and looser or more ‘informal’ networks of relationships which strengthen 
social or business ties and which may well emerge out of more formal relationships. Crucially, 
as well as providing lasting support, “it is through these networks that reputations are brought 
into focus and trust is instilled” (Henneberry and Parris, 2013: 233). It is important to know 
whether this process operates differently in networks characterised more by informality, such 
as those we can expect to find more often in smaller cities.  
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Network interests and tensions 
 
Much of the literature on broader growth coalitions and urban regimes presumes that city 
governments and local business elites share a common agenda constructed around urban 
growth and local economic development. Almost always, real estate actors are portrayed as 
operating at the core of formal networks, often supported by the local media, universities and 
business interests. We should not necessarily expect such a broad array of interests to coalesce 
in informal networks operating in smaller cities. Whereas the early concept of growth coalitions 
saw these interests coming together as independent participants acting autonomously (Molotch, 
1976; Logan and Molotch, 2007), twenty five years’ work in urban regime theory since Stone’s 
(1989) seminal exploration of Atlanta has provided a more nuanced explanation. Different 
situational variables reflecting the local (political) culture of each city influence the ways in 
which the urban resource base is shared, organised and mobilised, such that a distinctive ‘urban 
political order’ might be achieved to pursue development objectives (Stone, 2015). 
 
Whilst urban regime analysis mostly derives from US work, it remains an important lens 
through which to conceptualise urban development in Europe precisely because it “highlights 
a fact that is often neglected in the network governance literature — that, in reality, the agendas 
and participants of governance networks can be very different in different places and that this 
can lead to different types of socioeconomic outcomes” (Blanco, 2013: 276). Here, the Finnish 
experience reported by Kostiainen (2002) reveals how motives for participation in informal 
local networks vary according to distinctive local conditions. For example, not all network 
members are equally committed to, or indeed excited about, the prospects for urban and 
regional development since “It is not the primary aim of all network members to develop an 
urban region as such; some of them want to reach their own goals by means of the network” 
(Kostiainen, 2002: 615). 
 
Put crudely, some network members might be more interested in protecting or enhancing their 
own business interests than in promoting local economic growth as a whole. It is important to 
know whether smaller places, and especially those characterised by more informal networks, 
are more prone to such conflicts of interest. When present, they can influence local business 
attitudes towards the overall pace and direction of development, the extent to which it requires 
local capacity to be strengthened by externally-sourced skills and finance, and any expectations 
around local leadership. 
 
Network dynamics, capture and domination 
 
Much recent research on the operation of urban policy networks has embraced ideas of 
uncertainty and shifting dynamics in networks, most notably the range of theoretical and 
empirical work undertaken in the name of ‘assemblage’ studies. Whereas networks were once 
commonly thought of as “‘flat’ organisational forms that are characterised by informal 
relationships between essentially equal agents or social agencies” (Heywood, 2000: 19), 
McFarlane and Anderson (2011: 162) identify a common concern in assemblage work in 
analysing the “play between stability and change, order and disruption”, in explaining how 
urban policy networks operate. 
 
McCann and Ward (2012: 42) openly seek to “encourage both an attention to the composite 
and relational character of policies and cities and also to the various social practices that gather, 
or draw together, diverse elements of the world into relatively stable and coherent ‘things’” 
through assemblage approaches. Since development networks are often said to be dominated 
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by short-term business interests, the relationships between key actors can change quickly 
according to market conditions and commercial opportunity. 
 
If “cities can be understood as assemblages of materials and resources, knowledge and 
understandings” (McCann and Ward, 2012: 43), then unpacking the nature of the trade-offs 
between different components of local networks becomes crucial to understanding their 
practical operation. Networks provide an effective means to share intelligence and gain tacit 
knowledge. For example, a recent study of UK housebuilders revealed the importance they 
place on networks not markets to source their land supplies and shows how companies exploit 
networks to enhance their own competitiveness (Adams et al., 2012). Crucially, developers 
preferred to be well embedded in particular places because their operational efficiency requires 
place-specific knowledge and close connectivity with local professionals and decision-makers 
(Charney, 2007; Henneberry and Parris, 2013). Does enthusiastic participation in local 
development networks confer an added advantage in smaller places, simply because of the 
closer connectivity between key actors? 
 
Network inclusion and exclusion 
 
Network relations are highly dependent on trust and reputation, reflecting how deeply 
economic and political life is embedded in social relations. According to Cabral (2005), 
reputation is about whether we believe a particular actor to be something, while trust is about 
whether we expect that actor to do something. The very imperfection of markets makes trust 
essential in business relations since, as Gössling (2004: 675) argues: “In a perfect market, 
actors do not have to trust each other. Information is perfect and costless, contracts are 
complete, and enforcement of contracts is costless in the sense that it is not related to any 
transaction costs.” Trust can provide a more effective way to cope with market imperfections 
than reliance on contracts, guarantees, insurances and safeguards. As Macauley (1963: 58) 
originally argued, “businessmen often prefer to rely on ‘a man’s word’ in a brief letter, a 
handshake, or ‘common honesty and decency’- even where the transaction involves exposure 
to serious risks.” 
 
But reliance on trust and reputation rather than formal contracts does carry significant risk. 
Indeed, trust is always matched by vulnerability since irrespective of how far trust “alleviates 
the fear that one’s exchange partner will act opportunistically . . . the risk of opportunism must 
be present for trust to operate” (Bradach and Eccles, 1989: 104). At least at a personal level, 
trust thus depends on relative proximity to the person to be trusted (Brien, 1998) together with 
knowledge of their likely motivations (Hardin, 2006) and capabilities (Larson, 1992). This is 
why Granovetter (1985) stresses personal experience rather than general information about a 
prospective business partner. Although he highlights the advantages produced by connectivity 
into the widest set of networks, Granovetter (1992) also argues that reputations experienced 
first-hand will be more reliable than those observed at a distance. This is even more relevant in 
smaller cities, where first-hand contact, at least within the city, is likely to be the business norm. 
 
Close internal connectivity and reliability can thus be portrayed as a potential strength of local 
development networks and a clear expression of the ‘social capital’ that has become highly 
pervasive within the literature. For example, in places where local and regional developers have 
a substantial market share, dominant companies may see significant advantage in leading local 
development networks and turning them to their own advantage. However, such closeness also 
gives rise to significant concern around who might be excluded, implicitly or explicitly, from 
important networks and why, and about the broader implications of this. If actors with 
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legitimate interests are excluded, it undermines network accountability and legitimacy. Some 
local networks, for example, may be very inward-looking and serve to discourage fresh talent 
and enterprise, whether individual or corporate. Others may operate as an ‘old-boys club’, 
attracting only those of a certain gender, social status or political outlook. Others still may 
reinforce rather than span the public-private divide, accentuating barriers between businesses 
and local council (Adams et al., 2012). Picking up Bell and Jayne’s (2009) earlier comment 
that smallness is bound up with particular ways of acting, the extent to which small city 
networks may be especially prone to such exclusivity is an important matter for empirical 
investigation. We now turn to explain how we researched these issues in one small city in the 
north of Scotland and to set out what we found. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS 
 
Empirical context 
 
The research was undertaken in Inverness, Scotland, using the city as a single case study. A 
case study method was considered appropriate to generate the kind of rich in-depth material 
required to address the research questions. The research was seen as exploratory, opening up 
the field for further investigation and generating ideas and propositions that might extend 
existing literature and be subsequently tested elsewhere. The case study combined qualitative 
and quantitative data and proceeded in three stages, as set out below, once ethical approval had 
been granted. 
 
 
Figure 1: Key Data on Development Applicants and Agents in Inverness 
 
Key data on applicants: 
• 646 applications submitted by 252 separate applicants; 
• Of this 163 applicants submitted only a single application each, and a further 35 
applicants submitted only two applications each; 
• This left 54 applicants who submitted three or more applications each and who together 
were responsible for 63.6% of all applications submitted; 
• The majority of applications were even more concentrated. The top 27 applicants 
(submitting 5 or more applications) accounted for 50% of all applications, and the top 
10 applicants (submitting 10 or more applications) accounted for 33.1% of all 
applications; 
• The single most important applicant alone accounted for 16.4% of all applications. 
 
Key data on agents: 
• 450 applications were submitted by 123 separate agents; 
• Of this 62 agents submitted only a single application each and a further 25 agents 
submitted only two applications; 
• This left 36 agents who submitted three or more applications and who together were 
responsible for 75.1% of all applications submitted by agents; 
• The majority of applications were highly concentrated. The top 10 agents submitted 11 
applications or more, accounting for 49.5% of all applications; 
• The top four agents (submitting more than 22 applications) accounted for 34.4%.more 
than one third of all the applications submitted by agents 
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The first stage of the research interrogated the electronic web-based database of all planning 
applications submitted to Highland Council, which is the local administrative authority for 
Inverness. This concentrated on proposals for major change in Inverness, and not on small-
scale applications. This search was thus limited to major planning applications submitted in the 
Inverness area during a period of almost 17 years from January 1997 to November 2013.1 In 
total, 646 separate major planning applications were identified during the 17-year research 
horizon (see Figure 1). For each application, information was collected on the name and contact 
details of both the applicant and, where given, the agent who submitted the proposal on the 
applicant’s behalf (usually an architect, surveyor or other development consultant). From this 
information, we produced detailed frequency tables on who exactly has built Inverness in 
recent years. 
 
The second stage involved in-depth interviews with thirteen key development actors. Initially, 
approaches were made to the top 10 applicants and the top 10 agents drawn from the frequency 
tables. Five of the top ten applicants approached accepted the invitation for interview, and these 
included private-sector companies, housing associations as well as Highland Council itself, 
two of whose senior officials were interviewed separately. Although the response rate was only 
50%, it should be noted that two of the top ten applicants in the 1997-2013 period were no 
longer in business. Four of the top ten agents accepted the invitation for interview. Of these, 
three were architectural practices, while the fourth was a general building consultancy. Again, 
two of the top ten agents in the 1997-2013 period were no longer in business. 
 
Three further interviews were undertaken as a result of ‘snowballing’ out from the initial 
interviews, one with another architect and two others with representatives of Highland and 
Islands Enterprise (HIE), the Scottish Government’s economic development agency for the 
area. All interviews were conducted with senior and experienced staff and followed a loosely 
structured topic guide. Most took place face-to-face, but on one occasion, the interview was 
undertaken by telephone. All interviews were recorded and transcribed and then analysed 
thematically to generate the material on which this paper is based. 
 
The final stage of the research involved a detailed search of official planning documentation 
and other archival material to cross-check and extend the interview information. This was 
particularly helpful in setting the interview material in a broader context and discovering 
linkages between key players not necessarily mentioned during the interviews. 
 
 
4. INVERNESS – A RAPIDLY EXPANDING SMALL CITY 
 
Similar in many respects to other small cities on the north-western periphery of Europe such 
as Esbjerg, Galway, Gåvle and Kristiansand, Inverness is an urban centre of 67,000 people 
forming the core of a functional urban region of 150,000 people. As the northernmost UK city, 
Inverness provides administrative and other high-level urban functions for an extremely wide 
rural hinterland. It is the administrative seat of the Highland Council (HC), the UK’s largest 
local government area, covering a territory the size of Belgium. Its sheer distance from other 
major centres of population makes Inverness relatively self-contained in terms of its settlement 
structure, travel to work area and so on. In this respect, it contrasts with other small UK cities 
such as York, whose economy is becoming increasingly integrated with its much larger 
neighbour, Leeds (Brown, 2008). 
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However, given the extent of its regional functions, Inverness has a much more elevated 
position in the wider Scottish settlement hierarchy than its size would suggest: Inverness is 
only the 17th largest settlement in Scotland2, but is one of the seven formally recognised cities 
due to its functional importance. Consequently, we do not therefore presume that our findings 
will necessarily transfer to other small cities, which will have their own distinctive positions in 
their location and functional hierarchies. Indeed, analysis of particular local development 
networks must allow for variation in the way that the size and location of their host cities may 
interact to frame specific network characteristics. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Map of Inverness 
 
In many respects, Inverness has been widely regarded as a ‘policy success’, with population 
growth of 17% between 2001 and 2011 (HIE, 2014). Its economic development strategy over 
the last 30 years reflects those of many European cities: continued investment in transport and 
latterly ICT infrastructure, improvement of public realm in the city centre, public sector support 
for business development concentrated on high value sectors such as healthcare and life 
sciences, promotion of tourism to bring spending into the local economy, and expansion of 
retailing and the creative arts. 
 
Keen to maintain development momentum and establish Inverness’ status in government 
thinking about Scotland’s economic and territorial development, Highland Council articulated 
a City Vision for Inverness in 2010, the first coherent urban rather than regional development 
strategy for the city. It aims to develop human capital (skills enhancements, attracting key 
workers and specific professional talent), enhance the city’s ‘asset offer’ (environmental 
quality, public services and infrastructure provision - primarily improved transport links and 
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ICT), and create a new ‘brand identity’ based around ‘livability’ and distinctive Highland 
culture. With this in mind, we now turn to explore the importance of local development 
networks to the city’s recent transformation. 
 
 
5. NETWORK INTERESTS AND TENSIONS: THE EXTENT OF  
COMMONALITY OR CONFLICT BETWEEN KEY ACTORS 
 
Interviewees often told us that the rapid growth of Inverness was driven forward by a shared 
sense of direction between all key development actors. In the contemporary environment, the 
degree of interaction between state actors and private developers was widely perceived to be 
important in advertising that Inverness has the kind of mature networked governance that 
would be expected of a city with credible growth strategies and the capacity to deliver them. 
As a senior council officer said to us, the success of Inverness over recent years was due to “a 
very close group of developers” working in close proximity to the local authority. 
 
The two most prominent developers were perceived to be Tullochs and Robertsons, the former 
founded in Inverness in the 1930s and still largely concentrated in and around the city, and the 
latter established in nearby Elgin in 1964 and now much more diversified geographically and 
operationally. A small group of architectural and development consultancies depended heavily 
on these developers for continued work. As one consultant commented, “These are the guys 
that kept us in work through the recession”. This strong nexus was reinforced by a small 
number of community-based housing associations, seeking to meet housing needs neglected 
by mainstream private developers.  
 
Table 1 identifies the nine most important organisations that our interviewees regarded as 
having comprised the local development network in Inverness in recent years. Two or three 
additional organisations could be added to this list, although there was no unanimity among 
interviewees of precisely who these might be. It was also clear that other organisations with a 
much broader focus than development, such as the Chamber of Commerce and Inverness 
Caledonian Thistle Football Club, were integral to the network.   
 
Beyond its organisational face, the local development network in Inverness actually comprised 
a closely-knit group of perhaps 30 to 35 individuals with a common commitment to the 
development of the city3 and whose paths crossed regularly both in the course of business and 
socially in the manner described by Lawton-Smith and Romeo (2012) (see section 2). As one 
interviewee commented, because Inverness is a small city and geographically distant from 
anywhere of similar size “everybody knows everybody else so if you’re involved in 
development there you will know everyone and if you start operating there you will get to know 
everyone pretty quickly and because of that there is a reasonably open, collaborative ethos”, 
while another said “The upside of being in quite a small place is that you can establish good 
relationships and work with people - the downside is that you can never escape.” Very close 
connectivity was thus an important characteristic of the small city network found in Inverness. 
 
Some names were mentioned to us several times as particularly important and influential nodes 
in the network, such as two former senior Council officers, who one private-sector consultant 
regarded as “great, really good players - I never heard anyone saying a bad word about them”. 
The same was true in the reverse direction, with one senior public sector official telling us to 
contact a particular private-sector developer: “You must speak to X … Here is his number … 
just phone him and say you are doing a bit of research and that you spoke to me.” Crucially, 
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without any formal growth coalition, there existed in Inverness what another interviewee 
eloquently described “as a kind of ‘development club’ - which is a group of people who are 
more focused on that area of activity and they all spend an awful lot of time in each other’s 
company”. Informality, rather than formality, was an important feature of this particular small 
city network. Indeed, one of its most important distinguishing characteristics was the apparent 
absence of any need to formalise this network since all its members appeared to share a strong 
belief in working together to promote the city’s growth. Yet, as one interviewee pointed out, 
the network’s long-term survival was threatened by its very informality since several 
longstanding and experienced members were approaching retirement with no obvious 
replacements ready to assume their places. 
 
 
Table 1: Key Members of the Local Development Network in Inverness 
Actor Role Geographical 
focus 
Strategic intent Interest in 
development 
Attitude to 
growth 
Highland 
Council 
Local authority Highlands Well-managed, 
but rapid 
expansion of 
Inverness 
Achieving 
sustainable 
development, 
but at limited 
cost to public 
sector 
Very keen 
Highland & 
Islands 
Enterprise 
Economic 
development 
agency 
Highlands & 
Islands 
Expand & 
diversify 
economic base 
Creating 
location to 
attract science-
based industry 
Very keen 
Tulloch 
Homes 
Housebuilder Mainly north of 
Scotland 
Meeting demand 
for homes for 
owner-
occupation and 
more general 
development 
Acquiring  land 
& finance and 
building market 
housing for 
owner 
occupation 
Very keen 
Robertson 
Group 
Infrastructure, 
construction 
engineering & 
housebuilding 
conglomerate  
UK wide, but 
especially in 
Scotland & north 
of England 
Geographical & 
business 
diversification  
As supporting 
part of wider 
business 
portfolio  
Keen 
Albyn 
Housing 
Association 
Social housing 
provider 
Highlands Meeting need for 
affordable homes 
& supporting 
communities 
Acquiring  land 
& finance and 
building 
affordable 
housing for rent 
& shared equity 
Positive but 
concerns 
with lack of 
affordable 
homes 
Highland 
Housing 
Alliance 
Land purchaser Highlands Expand 
affordable 
housing supply 
Channel land to 
housing 
associations & 
building homes 
for rent 
Positive but 
concerns 
with lack of 
affordable 
homes 
Bracewell 
Stirling 
Architect 
consultants 
Scotland Reputation and 
repeat business 
as architects 
Professional 
fees 
Keen 
Keppie 
Design 
Architect 
consultants 
UK wide but 
concentrate in 
Scotland 
Reputation and 
repeat business 
as architects 
Professional 
fees 
Keen 
G H  
Johnston 
Building 
consultants 
Scotland Repeat business 
as design 
consultant 
Professional 
fees 
Very keen 
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Nevertheless, despite this perceived shared agenda, significant tensions existed. To several 
private-sector interviewees, the council had become too interventionist – perhaps even 
‘politicised’ – and too focused on matters of design detail, creating unwelcome uncertainty for 
developers. One long-established developer harked back to an earlier age, when independent 
councillors were dominant and developers’ plans were rarely challenged. He recalled that “One 
of the provosts (mayors) told me many times in the old days that what we should do is take 
developers like me and others, put them in a room, give them a blank canvas and say ‘what 
would you do’? So we did that conversationally for years.” 
 
Developers today looked to the local authority to provide a strategic vision for the city, and (as 
is commonplace elsewhere) often criticised it for not doing so effectively. Debates about 
development quality were a recurring source of conflict. As one interviewee commented, “the 
economic vision hasn’t been articulated as a civic spatial vision or place-making vision. 
There’s some beautiful parts of Inverness but there is some pretty awful bits as well.” Council 
officers criticised some developers for their lack of interest in place quality and for wanting to 
build housing estates with few social facilities. This reflected similar concerns across Scotland 
as a whole (see, for example, Scottish Government Council of Economic Advisers, 2008), 
suggesting that distinctive local development networks, even in small relatively self-contained 
cities, do not necessarily results in distinctive development products. 
 
While the local development network appeared implicitly to have ratified an agreed future 
direction for Inverness, it provided no common or democratic forum to resolve disagreements. 
Common purpose seemed to extend only so far, beyond which individual organisations were 
ready to pursue their own agendas, even if this brought them into conflict with each other and 
risked undermining the city’s strategic objectives. This conflict was at its most intense around 
access to land. According to Highland Council, the supply of development land in Inverness 
was “very, very healthy … but when you talk to particularly affordable housing developers, 
they’re saying ‘it’s not enough land’ and that’s because you have land banking” by the private 
sector. Indeed, one public sector observer we interviewed described this strategy by key 
developers as a “strangulation” of the land supply. As next explored, certain network members 
thus appeared better placed than others to take advantage of the growth of Inverness and were 
intent on exploiting their financial muscle to do so. 
 
 
6. NETWORK DYNAMICS, URBAN GROWTH AND LAND CAPTURE 
 
In the mid-1990s, the then Chief Executive of Tulloch Homes took a decision that he recalls 
everyone at the time believed would be the end of his company but which “turned out to be a 
superb transaction.” With the help of “a very good and friendly bank, called the Bank of 
Scotland”, he bought 600 acres of development land located on the then edge of Inverness, 
which had already been identified by the council as suitable for future development. Some of 
this land was eventually developed for business park and retail development, but most was 
devoted to new housing. By correctly anticipating future growth trends, Tulloch’s strategy of 
land banking enabled the company to dominate housing output in Inverness over the next two 
decades.  
 
Around 5,500 new homes were built by Tullochs as a result of this and other significant land 
purchases. But not all network members were happy with Tullochs. One of the professional 
architects interviewed recognised the competitive advantage that land control had given 
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Tullochs but believed it limited opportunities for external market entry and thus – from his 
personal point of view – commissions from a wider group of developers. A senior council 
official took a similar view, saying “It’s not a monopoly land situation but there is more 
concentration of land ownership so it is probably quite hard for other developers to get into 
Inverness area or it has been over the years.” Monopoly in this sense is, of course, a relative 
concept, and must be related to the overall extent of local land supplies. The smaller the city, 
the less land needs to be controlled for a single developer to achieve what the council official 
in Inverness saw as a monopoly. 
 
Among several external developers reported to have tried to take advantage of the growth of 
Inverness in the early years of the 21st century were Barratt and Laing O’Rourke. Evidently, 
however, they did not find it easy to break into the local development network, unless working 
in joint ventures with Tullochs or another main player. In some cases, they seemed to lack the 
nimble ‘entrepreneurial’ approach to business which has served Tullochs well. One 
interviewee, for example, criticised the more bureaucratic approach of Morrisons, a large 
contractor-developer which he felt did not fully understand the differences between speculative 
development and public tendering. 
 
Moreover, according to Tullochs’ former Chief Executive, the recession of 2008-09 saw the 
rapid departure of most external developers because they could no longer achieve their required 
20-25% profit margins. Tullochs, however, continued to operate in the city, if at a reduced 
building rate of 150 rather than 250 homes per year, because its longstanding land bank made 
a 15% profit margin quite sufficient. This resilience in the face of an unprecedented financial 
crisis became a key narrative in many of our interviewees’ articulations of the city’s strengths. 
 
 
7. TRUST, REPUTATION AND NETWORK EXCLUSIVITY 
 
The relative remoteness and limited size of Inverness appeared to enhance the importance of 
trust and reputation as network bonds. As one interviewee commented: “Your nearest 
competitor city is 100 miles away but that also gives you a good sense of cohesion … It’s a 
small community so everyone knows everyone and you get to establish good relationships and 
trust.” One architect emphasised how crucial personal recommendations, whether for 
delivering a “project on time, to budget – very important” or simply for being “good at problem 
solving”, were in building up business. 
 
It was also clear that companies who could not be trusted were deliberately kept at a distance. 
We were advised by two different interviewees, for example, to avoid talking to another 
potential interviewee. One from the public sector said “I wouldn’t go to them to be honest … 
I’d better not say too much … There have been issues reported in the press about them not 
delivering on their responsibilities in terms of they’ve got planning permission to build houses 
and they’re supposed to look after the common areas and they just walked away from it.” 
Another from the private sector was just as critical: “It's a ‘how can we cut corners’ type of 
organisation and we won't work for these people.” We did, of course, hear many more positive 
narratives of the interaction between members of the development network and of the social 
capital evident within it which, just as for the more negative sentiments, indicated the 
importance of perception to reputation-building. 
 
Although the Chamber of Commerce provided one well-established meeting point for business 
contact, with its regular dinners evidently generating valuable opportunities to meet other 
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business contacts socially, the real informal hub of the network turned out to be the local 
football team, Inverness Caledonian Thistle (ICT), which has been founded only in 1994, but 
rapidly made its way up to the Scottish Premiership. The rise of Inverness Caledonian Thistle 
was emblematic of the city’s growth, creating what Cox (1999) calls a positive symbol to which 
all citizens could relate, and provided a cornerstone for the local network. Here, our findings 
chime with the North American growth coalition literature that “Professional teams serve many 
latent social functions … sustaining the growth ideology is clearly one of them” (Logan and 
Molotch, 2007: 81). The Inverness case study provides new evidence to show how sports 
franchises can permeate informal small city networks equally well as formal large city ones.  
 
A key figure in the club’s success was the former Chief Executive of Tullochs, who as 
Chairman and subsequently Club President had invested £5 million of his own money in ICT. 
In a newspaper interview newspaper, he was reported as getting “his payback from having built 
a successful, sustainable club that reflects well on the Tulloch Group, fosters goodwill for the 
company and indulges his footballing passion” (The Scotsman, 2013). The club’s formation 
had even been supported by the local state through investment from Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise allowing it to nominate a member of the Board. This was thought to confirm 
Inverness’ arrival as a ‘proper city’ with real presence in Scottish national life.  
 
What makes these connections significant is that, according to one interviewee “quite a lot of 
business is done on a Saturday afternoon at the Caley Thistle.” As a mid-career woman, she 
felt excluded from what she saw as a gathering of men in their 50s, especially as “All of these 
people have been there for a very long time so they stop those who are the new people coming 
in to fill their shoes”. This comment was reflected by a different interviewee who said “So in 
some ways there’s quite a tight net group of people. And I think for folk that are not everyday 
part of that group, it can be difficult to have an open dialogue with them. They can be a bit 
clubbish I think and that raises difficulties.” Such exclusivity is likely to be a particular danger 
in the kind of informal network found in a small city such as Inverness and presents difficult 
challenges for a network style of governance in such a city. 
 
The research thus highlighted two sides of closely-knit local development networks. On the 
one hand, those at the centre of the network knew each other well, relied heavily on trust and 
reputation, could arrange to meet quickly, and interwove their business and leisure connections. 
On the other hand, the network could easily be perceived by outsiders as a barrier to business. 
Although tentative, such conclusions raise serious questions about the ‘dark side’ of business 
networking. When that particular type of business is primarily focused on the future city 
development, those questions must all be of public concern. 
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our work raises important questions about how development happens in small cities. We found 
several network members who were keen to explain how the existence of a close network, built 
on informality and trust, allowed development to occur faster than might otherwise be the case, 
and for Inverness to cope with the post- 2008 recession better than elsewhere. This network 
resilience undoubtedly played an important role in sustaining the growth narrative of the city 
through difficult circumstances, and thus in supporting its population and economic growth. 
 
Yet, the operation of the Inverness network also had uncomfortable implications for 
transparency and accountability. A recurring tension was apparent between its operational 
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efficiency and the articulated strategy for the city. The small scale of Inverness meant that no 
formal ‘growth coalition’ was in place to manage the relationship between public agencies and 
private-sector developers. Instead, the informal network had many attributes of a ‘club’ in 
which key private-sector actors enjoyed strong mutual relationships based on longstanding 
trust. Although it minimised transaction costs, this ‘club’ mentality had clear downsides. First, 
it presented a real barrier to the entry of new players into the local real estate marketplace. 
Although one local developer was especially dismissive of those who “dip in and out of markets 
they don’t understand” (Sutherland, 2015: 161), markets that restrict new entrants increase the 
potential for oligopolistic behaviour, which can artificially inflate prices while lowering choice 
and quality for consumers. 
 
Second, the centrality of the city’s football club, as a key node in which discussions around 
development took place, also raises important questions about plurality and openness. 
Transacting business informally in an environment tightly proscribed in terms of gender, 
ethnicity etc. raises concerns about transparency and good governance. But as Romzek et al. 
(2012: 442) underline, to discover how networked governance really operates, we must explore 
informal accountabilities within such a ‘club’. Here, we found that key private-sectors actors 
within the ‘club’ often saw public authorities as located on the periphery of the network, not at 
its core. Whilst the task of public sector agencies is often defined as managing the “design and 
evaluation of enduring inter-organizational relationships, where trust, relational capital and 
relational contracts act as the core governance mechanisms” (Osborne, 2006: 384), this 
becomes problematic when network discussions take place in an environment where the 
involvement of public officials is discouraged by protocol (e.g. the Directors’ Box of the local 
football club). We found evidence that the development network would often have reached 
consensus on a particular issue before substantive discussions with public agencies had taken 
place, thus undermining the local state’s power to deliver on its vision and objectives.  
 
Our research framework was built upon the notion of scale as an important yet under-
researched facet of urban networks. We previously noted that most theorising about urban 
governance networks relates to larger cities and metropolitan areas. In our study of a small city, 
we found evidence that network dynamics were rather different. Bovaird (2006) notes that 
public-sector actors find it particularly hard to control network operations and outcomes, given 
their multiple relationships with network actors and the complexity this brings. However, in 
Inverness, the social and cultural cohesiveness of a small group of around 35 actors appeared 
to reduce the capacity of the local state to implement its vision for strategic development. 
Indeed, a fundamental ‘incompatibility’ between networked governance models and 
democratic ideals (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007) may be magnified in small cities with limited 
public resources, especially if a few private-sector actors are dominant. 
 
This obviously raises important questions for public authorities charged with governing small 
cities, many of which have limited capacity precisely because of their small scale. But it also 
presents a challenge to the current wave of network studies that emphasise the fluidity of 
network assembly and situational complexity. In our study, we found a network that was very 
tightly ‘bounded’ indeed; there was strong consensus between actors about who did and did 
not belong to the network, its rules and norms, and the cultural contexts in which trust was built 
and relationships maintained. Indeed, the network’s power in relation to the local state was 
enhanced by its consistency, cohesiveness and impenetrability, in part generated by the specific 
times and places in which business discussions took place. 
 
16 
 
Yet, despite apparent strength, informal small-city networks such as that found in Inverness 
can also be characterised by inherent fragility. The biggest risk to the network was thus not 
potential challenge from new market entrants or changing political contexts but a lack of 
succession planning for when key individuals retired. In the meantime, however, although the 
Inverness development network may well be organised informally, its cohesiveness and ability 
to mobilise its power bestowed it with significant influence on the development trajectory for 
this particular small city.  
 
In broader theoretical terms, our findings certainly uncover the kind of ‘messiness’ inherent in 
many policy processes that Chhotray and Stoker’s identify in their wider (2009) review of 
governance dynamics. Of particular importance is their notion of the ‘delegation’ of tasks 
between different governing organisations and institutions active in different geographies 
based on pragmatism rather than strict adherence to formal policy  architectures. Thus whilst 
the Scottish Government’s National Planning Framework (2004: 75) set a fairly unambiguous 
aspiration for Inverness as part of wider national economic development targets – that the city 
“needs to develop its role as the Highland capital, broaden its economic base, improve its 
connections to the other cities and the rest of the world, and attract a wider range of high quality 
jobs” – in terms of the implementation of policy in pursuit of these goals, it largely ‘delegated’ 
or left the Inverness development network ‘to get on with it’ and deliver growth within this 
general framework. 
 
Here we also find Paavola’s (2007:93) work useful, in particular his observation that the key 
to understanding how multi-tier governance arrangements work in practice requires an 
analytical approach that “can gain resolution by looking at the functional and structural tiers, 
organization of governance functions, and formulation of key institutional rules as key aspects 
of the design of governance institutions”. For Inverness, the key institutional ‘rule’ we 
uncovered was the explicit pro-growth posture of the governing network, built of a strong sense 
of cohesion and shared direction between network members. However, whilst we identify the 
extent to which the cohesion of the network, its resilience and the shared interests of its 
members enabled generally ‘successful’ outcomes in Inverness, there must also be the risk that, 
on some occasions, small networks will lack the expertise and capacity to implement the kinds 
of development strategies that are primarily developed for larger places, and then replicated in 
small cities in order to achieve policy consistency at the national level. 
 
In terms of the avenues for future research opened up by our work in Inverness, perhaps the 
most obvious research question arising concerns the extent to which small cities are able to 
leverage their distinctiveness and flexibility to enact different policies within overall strategic 
frameworks set by higher tiers, rather than simply implement ‘big city’ strategies and policies 
more quickly and effectively than elsewhere. Our research suggests that to understand this we 
need to interrogate more deeply how the kind of networks we found in Inverness operate and 
how this serves to structure local power relations, particularly in terms of who is able to become 
an ‘insider’ and be eligible for potential inclusion in the network. 
 
So, for example, while we have identified the Director’s Box of Inverness Caledonian Thistle 
as an important node within the network, we remain unsure whether such nodes provide a 
critical focus for substantive exchange on policy debates within the network, or merely help 
build the necessarily trust and reputation to facilitate exchange elsewhere. Similarly, we need 
know more precisely how network exclusivity operates, especially in relation to gender. To 
what extent, for example, does the lack of formality facilitate behaviours that would be deemed 
unacceptable in a more formal setting? These are the kind of issues where a substantive 
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ethnographic study could prove particularly useful. Associated work might also distinguish 
more fully between the comparative importance of individuals and organisations in formal and 
informal networks and the implications of this for network survival. In this case, ethnographic 
approaches could helpfully be reinforced by interrogating documentary evidence that enables 
network connections to be mapped out in more detail. 
 
Finally, we suspect that much more could be said about the political connectivity (or lack of it) 
of the kind of informal networks we found in Inverness. Are key network players also involved 
in local political parties, either directly or in helping to fund election campaigns? Or does 
network participation render such activity unnecessary? Knowing more about this would 
further address the essential question of whether informal development networks reinforce or 
subvert local democratic decision-making, which is crucial to ensuring smaller networks retain 
the high levels of transparency and accountability expected of any democratic governance 
structure.  
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